The Affect of National Culture on Human Resources Essay -- Human Resour

INTRODUCTIONIn todays business environment, the complexity of inter topic business has increased and inter matter competition has been highlighted as an essential element for multi subject area firms (MNCs). Thus, in order to gain competitive advantage, various resources are utilized, such as financial capital, technology location or human resource (HR). Moreover, HR could be seemed as one of the most important resource which has also become a focus of attention of ranking(prenominal) managers in MNCs. As suggested by MacMillan(1984), MNCs can gain competitive advantage through use of HR practice, such as training, compensation, socialization, selection, performance appraisal and race development, as long as other firms are unable to duplicate their efforts easily and quickly. However, while HR practices and policies are performing across countries, finishing would be a key point. Culture can be defined not only at the national, but also at the group, organizational, and even inte rnational level. each(prenominal) these finales have certain effects on the choice and efficiency of HR policies and practices. Between national and other types of socialization, therefore, need to be divided clearly because national culture makes a unique contribution to understanding HR policies and practices. Therefore, there is no doubt that national culture is a key reckon on HR practices or polices, as a functional activity in international business. In this paper, the role and effects of national culture in HR will be discussed firstly. And then the potential problems that MCNs may have if they do not consider national culture as a key performer in HRM success. In the final stage, the solution of those problems will be presented in this paper.THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN HU... ...aeger, A. M. (1986) Organization development and national culture Wheres the fit? , in Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, pp. 178-190.Hill, C.W.L. (2005) International Business Competing in the Global Marketplace (5th ed.), New York Mc Graw-Hill/IrwinHofstede, G. (1993) Cultural constrains in management theories, in Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 81-93.MacMillan, I. C. (1984) Gaining competitive advantage through human resource management practice, in Human Resource Management, Vol. 23, Iss. 1, pp. 241-255.Punnett, B. J. & Ricks, D. A. (1992) International business, Boston PWSKent.Schuler, R. S. & Jackson S. E. (1994) crossing or divergence Human resource practices and policies for competitive advantage worldwide, in International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 267-99. The Affect of National Culture on Human Resources Essay -- Human ResourINTRODUCTIONIn todays business environment, the complexity of international business has increased and international competition has been highlighted as an essential element for multinational firms (MNCs). Thus, in order to gain competitive advantage, variou s resources are utilized, such as financial capital, technology location or human resource (HR). Moreover, HR could be seemed as one of the most important resource which has also become a focus of attention of higher-ranking managers in MNCs. As suggested by MacMillan(1984), MNCs can gain competitive advantage through use of HR practice, such as training, compensation, socialization, selection, performance appraisal and life story development, as long as other firms are unable to duplicate their efforts easily and quickly. However, while HR practices and policies are performing across countries, culture would be a key point. Culture can be defined not only at the national, but also at the group, organizational, and even international level. all(prenominal) these cultures have certain effects on the choice and efficiency of HR policies and practices. Between national and other types of culture, therefore, need to be divided clearly because national culture makes a unique contribut ion to understanding HR policies and practices. Therefore, there is no doubt that national culture is a key cipher on HR practices or polices, as a functional activity in international business. In this paper, the role and effects of national culture in HR will be discussed firstly. And then the potential problems that MCNs may have if they do not consider national culture as a key factor in HRM success. In the final stage, the solution of those problems will be presented in this paper.THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN HU... ...aeger, A. M. (1986) Organization development and national culture Wheres the fit? , in Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, pp. 178-190.Hill, C.W.L. (2005) International Business Competing in the Global Marketplace (5th ed.), New York Mc Graw-Hill/IrwinHofstede, G. (1993) Cultural constrains in management theories, in Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 81-93.MacMillan, I. C. (1984) Gaining competitive advantage through human resou rce management practice, in Human Resource Management, Vol. 23, Iss. 1, pp. 241-255.Punnett, B. J. & Ricks, D. A. (1992) International business, Boston PWSKent.Schuler, R. S. & Jackson S. E. (1994) lap or divergence Human resource practices and policies for competitive advantage worldwide, in International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 267-99. The Affect of National Culture on Human Resources Essay -- Human ResourINTRODUCTIONIn todays business environment, the complexity of international business has increased and international competition has been highlighted as an essential element for multinational firms (MNCs). Thus, in order to gain competitive advantage, various resources are utilized, such as financial capital, technology location or human resource (HR). Moreover, HR could be seemed as one of the most important resource which has also become a focus of attention of senior(a) managers in MNCs. As suggested by MacMillan(1984), MNCs c an gain competitive advantage through use of HR practice, such as training, compensation, socialization, selection, performance appraisal and public life development, as long as other firms are unable to duplicate their efforts easily and quickly. However, while HR practices and policies are performing across countries, culture would be a key point. Culture can be defined not only at the national, but also at the group, organizational, and even international level. on the whole these cultures have certain effects on the choice and efficiency of HR policies and practices. Between national and other types of culture, therefore, need to be divided clearly because national culture makes a unique contribution to understanding HR policies and practices. Therefore, there is no doubt that national culture is a key factor on HR practices or polices, as a functional activity in international business. In this paper, the role and effects of national culture in HR will be discussed firstly. A nd then the potential problems that MCNs may have if they do not consider national culture as a key factor in HRM success. In the final stage, the solution of those problems will be presented in this paper.THE ROLE OF NATIONAL CULTURE IN HU... ...aeger, A. M. (1986) Organization development and national culture Wheres the fit? , in Academy of Management Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 1, pp. 178-190.Hill, C.W.L. (2005) International Business Competing in the Global Marketplace (5th ed.), New York Mc Graw-Hill/IrwinHofstede, G. (1993) Cultural constrains in management theories, in Academy of Management Executive, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 81-93.MacMillan, I. C. (1984) Gaining competitive advantage through human resource management practice, in Human Resource Management, Vol. 23, Iss. 1, pp. 241-255.Punnett, B. J. & Ricks, D. A. (1992) International business, Boston PWSKent.Schuler, R. S. & Jackson S. E. (1994) product or divergence Human resource practices and policies for competitive advantage w orldwide, in International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 5, Iss. 2, pp. 267-99.

Care of Patients with Multiple Sclerosis Essay -- central nervous syste

Multiple sclerosis (MS) is an acquired de medullaating disease of the commutation nervous system (CNS) that typically is discoverd in the second or third decade of life. Normally, nerves be enclosed in medulla sheaths that help facilitate transmission of nerve impulses within the CNS and the peripheral nervous system throughout the body. In patients with MS, the myelin sheath is damaged and eventually degenerates, causing patches of scar tissue called plaques or lesions to occur anywhere randomly on the myelin sheath (Ruto, 2013). This results in afflicted nerve conductivity, which interferes with message transmission between the brain and the other parts of the body. As a result, impulse transmission is altered, distorted, short-circuited, or completely absent. This interference in impulse transmission creates muscle weakness, muscle imbalance, and possibly muscle spasms with partial or complete paralysis. Multiple sclerosis also can result in visual impairment and alteratio n of cognitive abilities, as well as pain, numbness, or tingling sensations (Ruto, 2013).MS affects about 400,000 persons in the USA and approximately 2.1million worldwide. The mediocre out age of onset is between 2040 long time, although it can also occur in young children and in people aged 50 years and to a greater extent. It is estimated that the direct and indirect healthc ar costs of MS in the United States result in approximately $35,000 spent per year per patient. Multiple sclerosis affects women more than men (DeLuca & Nocentini, 2011).Case study patientJ.S. is a 25 year old Caucasian female, admitted to the hospital after she experienced a seizure. J.S. has no hx of seizures in the past. Upon evaluation, J.S. complaint that for the past year she has experienced blur... ...Physical rehabilitation, and pain management.ConclusionMultiple sclerosis is a serious disabling disease. Usually, the disease is mild, but several(prenominal) people lose the ability to write , speak, or walk. There is no single test for MS. Doctors use a medical history, physical exam, neurological exam, MRI, and other tests to call it. There is no cure for MS, but there ar drugs that slow the progression of the disease. As of now, there are eight drugs that have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A tremendous amount of progress has been made. Most of these drugs target only the early stage of the disease, not the progressive stages that are worse. Treatment often depends on which type of MS an individual has.ReferencesRuto, C. (2013). Special Needs Populations Care of Patients with Multiple Sclerosis. AORN Journal, 98(3), 281-293. Care of Patients with Multiple Sclerosis Essay -- central nervous systeMultiple sclerosis (MS) is an acquired demyelinating disease of the central nervous system (CNS) that typically is diagnosed in the second or third decade of life. Normally, nerves are enclosed in myelin sheaths that help f acilitate transmission of nerve impulses within the CNS and the peripheral nervous system throughout the body. In patients with MS, the myelin sheath is damaged and eventually degenerates, causing patches of scar tissue called plaques or lesions to occur anywhere randomly on the myelin sheath (Ruto, 2013). This results in damage nerve conductivity, which interferes with message transmission between the brain and the other parts of the body. As a result, impulse transmission is altered, distorted, short-circuited, or completely absent. This interference in impulse transmission creates muscle weakness, muscle imbalance, and possibly muscle spasms with partial or complete paralysis. Multiple sclerosis also can result in visual impairment and alteration of cognitive abilities, as well as pain, numbness, or tingling sensations (Ruto, 2013).MS affects about 400,000 persons in the USA and approximately 2.1million worldwide. The average age of onset is between 2040 years, although it can also occur in young children and in people aged 50 years and more. It is estimated that the direct and indirect healthcare costs of MS in the United States result in approximately $35,000 spent per year per patient. Multiple sclerosis affects women more than men (DeLuca & Nocentini, 2011).Case study patientJ.S. is a 25 year old Caucasian female, admitted to the hospital after she experienced a seizure. J.S. has no hx of seizures in the past. Upon evaluation, J.S. complaint that for the past year she has experienced blur... ...Physical rehabilitation, and pain management.ConclusionMultiple sclerosis is a serious disabling disease. Usually, the disease is mild, but some people lose the ability to write, speak, or walk. There is no single test for MS. Doctors use a medical history, physical exam, neurological exam, MRI, and other tests to diagnose it. There is no cure for MS, but there are drugs that slow the progression of the disease. As of now, there are eight drugs t hat have been approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A tremendous amount of progress has been made. Most of these drugs target only the early stage of the disease, not the progressive stages that are worse. Treatment often depends on which type of MS an individual has.ReferencesRuto, C. (2013). Special Needs Populations Care of Patients with Multiple Sclerosis. AORN Journal, 98(3), 281-293.

Use of Mise en Scene in the Film Yellow Earth :: Movie Film Essays

Use of Mise en Scene in the Film Yellow hideThe film Yellow Earth is the sad tale of a girl being forced to follow her fate. She sees an opportunity to escape in a foreigner, a soldier from the south. In this film, director Chen Kaige and cinematographer Zhang Yimou create windows into their characters. Several scenes are made more significant because of the use of mise en scene. This technique allows the beauty to see everything that happens during the course of the scene.The most impactful scene is perhaps when the soldier Gu is first brought into their home. Although the camera will show different shots, time is still continuous. It is non an interruption and is only moving to provide the audience with a better view. The continuousness of time is consequential because the audience knows everything that is occurring between the characters. The viewer hears their conversations and their silences. This use if mise en scene allows the viewer to get a sense of the tension between G u and the family (as he is a newcomer), and between Cuiqiao and the others.There are two main angles that Yimou uses in this scene. One is centered on Gu and the other is centered on Cuiqiao, from slightly to the right of Gus perspective. Whenever the shot is facing Gu, it is at his level. Everything is level with his camera angle and straight with his life. Cuiqiaos angle, however, is looking down on her. This is reflective of her current emotional state. She is sorrowful and repressed.Whenever a character performs an important action, the camera shows them. The first time that Cuiqiao and Han Han are spoken to, they become visible. Also, we see Cuiqiaos reactions when they are important to her characterization. Gu speaks somewhat about the South and how clear and wonderful it is. Cuiqiaos curiosity is expressed on her face. The audience also sees Cuiqiao forgetting about what she is doing with the bellows.

To Kill a Mocking Bird Newspaper Project -- To Kill a Mockingbird Essay

Today in Maycomb County, there was a trail against a local African American slice named Tom Robinson. He was accused for raping and beating up a white girl named Mayella. His lawyer is Atticus Finch is facing off against Mr. Gilmer the district attorney. Judge Taylor, appears to be sleeping through out the trial, yet pays attention and tends to chew his cigar. The supposed crime occurred in Mayellas home, when Tom Robinson went to fix something and then he plundered her. Atticus calls up his first witness, Bob Ewell. He asked questions like Would you ever beat your daughter? and Where you on the night of the crime? Bob Ewell answered that he never has beaten his daughter and was somewhere else at the time of the crime. After that, he asked Bob to write his name, and Atticus not...

Necrophilia in A Rose for Emily Essay example -- A Rose For Emily, Will

William Faulkners short story, A Rose for Emily is often held as a literary classic due to Faulkner?s ability to play with our mind and emotions almost to the point of frustration. However, there is much more than mind games that Faulkner plays that makes this story great. Emily Grierson, the main character, is a strong-willed stubborn octogenarian bitty, who was quite odd, this alone is a reason for greatness. To fully understand why Emily is the way that she is one must saying past the obvious and truly look at Emily. Emily Grierson has a mental condition that is just itching to be discovered. Miss Emily was part of the highly revered Grierson family, the aristocrats of the town. They held themselves to a higher standard, and nothing or nobody was ever good enough for them. Faulkner fist gives us the clue of Emilys mental condition when he refers to Emilys great-aunt, Lady Wyatt. Faulkner tells us that Lady Wyatt had gone exclusively crazy (Faulkner 93). Due to the higher standa rds they had set for themselves, they believed that they were too high for that and then distanced themselv...

Necrophilia in A Rose for Emily Essay example -- A Rose For Emily, Will

William Faulkners short story, A Rose for Emily is often held as a literary classic due to Faulkner?s ability to play with our reason and emotions almost to the point of frustration. However, there is much more than mind games that Faulkner plays that makes this story great. Emily Grierson, the main character, is a strong-willed stubborn old bitty, who was quite odd, this alone is a reason for greatness. To fully understand why Emily is the way that she is one must look past the obvious and truly look at Emily. Emily Grierson has a psychological condition that is just itching to be discovered. Miss Emily was part of the highly revered Grierson family, the aristocrats of the town. They held themselves to a higher(prenominal) standard, and nothing or nobody was ever pricy enough for them. Faulkner fist gives us the clue of Emilys mental condition when he refers to Emilys great-aunt, Lady Wyatt. Faulkner tells us that Lady Wyatt had gone completely crazy (Faulkner 93). Due to the hig her standards they had set for themselves, they believed that they were too high for that and then distanced themselv...

How does fitzgerald tell the story in chapter

How does Fitzgerald tell the fib in chapter 1 of The Great Gatsby? Fitzgerald opens the first chapter introducing us to Nick Carroway, who is clearly of first person narration and he is tattle the story from the future. By telling the story as though it has already occurred, Fitzgerald has created the Illusion that his maln character has already experienced the events that are unfolding. This ensures that Nick is a backward narrator throughout the book but also obviously a bias story teller.Fitzgerald makes it kn suffer that Nick has already met altogether the characters and knows hem and their story, he openly has his own personal imaginements and opinions of them, also making It clear he is going to be a bias narrator, giving out in sinless and colored information to the reader. The chapter also tells us about Nicks life in New York when he lived in 1922 and his life in West Egg. Fitzgeralds purpose of chapter i is in the main to introduce the characters of the book and to drop hints and revelations for the events in the rest of the book, such as suggesting written reports of class and characterisation of Gatsby.The chapter also presents us the relationship etween Tom and Daisy Buchanan. Furthermore, the housing is profoundly described by Fitzgerald, A sunken Italian garden, a half-acre of deep, pungent roses, and a snub- nosed motor boat that bumped the tide offshore. This presents an Image of overflowinges and the strong themes of money linked with social class due to the immense description of the expansive pedestal Tom and Daisy took for granted. The authors description of the houses shows the difference clearly surrounded by Nicks home which hed Rented In one of the strangest communities, Inexpensive In comparison toTom and Daisys house which was a representation of old money. This is again also shown in chapter one with Gatsbys home which Nick had described as a mansion, Implying that his house Is huge and could possibly link to Gatsbys p ersonality from what we know of him. This shows that Gatsby has new wealth and that he scarce bought his mansion to fit his stereotyped personality and ego. Fitzgerald still telling the story from Nicks point of view, makes the audience aware that Nick is new into this lifestyle, and that he is not specially wealthy within his own devices.However I think Its clear from the start that Nick will have to change his personality also In format to fit in with everyone else and his friends. This is due to the fact that when Nick starts the Buchannans house, he is confused and a little disgusted. This is aimed at the attitude Daisy has towards Toms evident promiscuity and blatant contest he has going on with a girl from New York as Daisy is aware and doesnt show both sign of caring that her husband Is having an affair as she Is not making any effort to stop it.Hes confused as to why Daisy doesnt simply leave Tom and find someone else, but as I said he has yet to adjust to the mind-se t of the rich and foolish upper- class. This Is done well by Fitzgerald however, as It gives Nicka sense of lower status In comparison to his friends in that before he becomes Involved them he must first adjust his personality. Not only does this work on a human level, but it also reveals more about Nicks character as he explained how genuine and non-judgemental he completely fake in front of these friends he has made.This can Introduce and theme of people being fake. The author starts off the story in chapter one, talking to the reader through Nick, Whenever you feel like criticizing any one ust remember that all the people in this world havent had the advantages that youve had. This is the first case of Fitzgerald pointing towards the reader and asking them to look at themselves. This is because of the fact that we all Judge our friends, our familVHow does Fitzgerald tell the story in chapter 1 of The Great GatsbV? , and other members f community in our mind, but we do not all have the heroism to come out and say it. Nick does not talk of his opinions as far as I know from chapter one to his friends, the story tells us all his accurate Judgements of the other characters. However I dont think we can trust his completely as he is bias. I think Fitzgerald has purposely done that to leave a mystery of Nick from what I can tell from chapter one alone, but also Nick can be considered reliable as he speaks his opinions to the readers and doesnt hold back whats on his mind.Nick is portrayed to us as an honest guy in the first hapter, however I think he is of the theme fake a he is being nice to the people he has met so far despite the Judgements he has formed of them. So he gets along with everyone in public but Judges them in private which is only revealed to us readers. I think that Nick is a very real and genuine character, and that Fitzgerald has created an accurate depiction of the average American man. He isnt born to old money, and isnt born in to new mon ey, hes Just born into a normal family, making his own judgements.Even though Nick can be considered a secret hypocrite. And even though he claims to be appalled and disgusted by the ways of the rich and upper- classes due to the cheating that goes on, on Toms behalf, it fascinates him, and he wants to know more. I think that this is where Fitzgerald has made us somewhat like Nick as he is Just a normal person trying to change to fit in with his surroundings and peers. So I think that Fitzgerald is telling us the story in chapter one through Nick as us readers can relate to him being a regular person, so in some ways we live the story and there is a part of Nick in all of us.

Coachella

Coachella One of my favorite terminations is the Coachella Music Festival, a music fans ultimate adventure. My friend Isaac and I had aforethought(ip) our trip for months. The event was two days, split up because of the hundreds of bands playing. We bought our ticket months in advance for one day. The line-up for that day was amazing. The line up consisted of Radio Head, Pixies, Kraftwerk, Rapture, Death Cab for Cutie, and many more. If you love alternative music, this is it. We also had planned to stay the night, so we pre-booked a room in hotel nearby.Our destination was Indio California, near Palm Springs. The drive from San Jose to Indio was about 427 miles. We headed out early morning, stopped a checkmate times to use the restroom and refuel. Driving on Highway 10, was mostly desert. The only interesting configurations worth gazing were the plain white wind mills. Hundreds lined up, crossways acres of desert land. Some of the giant windmills propelled with the slight dry win d. We finally had arrived and it felt like we stepped into a depleted tropical land. Luckily, the hotel we stayed in included a swimming poolIt was the day of the event, so we made sure to dress accordingly. We also made sure to bring plenty of water. The parking area was a chaotic scrabble of vehicles. The walk to the gates was a good 10 minutes. This was only the beginning this event was spread out onto 90 acres. No wonder, GoldenVoice (Coachella Organizers) held event in this location Empire Polo Club. The first idea that came to mind was to plan our day according to music events itinerary. A mass of 100,000 people would be diverged among the Polo Fields.Coachellas map out of event accommodated all with multiple stages, international food stands, alcohol and beverage stands, in door lounges to cool off, numerous tents with DJs, invention installations, Coachella souvenir stands, porta potties in large quantities, ATMs, Security, and First Aide stands. The lines were a quarter mi le long, or more for all stands. At this point, my friend Isaac and I decided we would cool off with a Heineken. Next we took our place in line to get a bite to eat. Of course everything is overpriced, since it is a music concert.

Hobbes` Rwandan Leviathan Essay

In 1994 the world publi city was shaken by the events in Rwanda, which later were written win in the history books as Rwanda crisis. According to the local sources, however, this tragedy had been rooted long to begin with the indicated year, particularly it is reported to start in 1990. 1990 is marked by Uganda personnels having invaded Rwanda. In addition, this was aggravated by the fact that two presidents of Burundi were assassinated.In order to get the more complete outlook on the location before the crisis unitary should be aw atomic number 18 that in 1994 (before the black day of the President of Rwanda, Habyarimana, killing) there were one million of displaced people in Rwanda constantly fleeing from the north of the uncouthwealth to the capital Kigali (1, 2006). Hence, to accommodate for both told this vast mass a very huge refugee camp had been organized. After their President was killed these people rushed to the city to grab boththing they could.As a result there were more than 300 000 deaths between 1990 and 1994, which prevents us from limiting the crisis to the year of 1994 only (1, 2006). But this was only a preface. In brief, the Rwanda crisis locoweed be described as follows The lives of nearly a million people had been taken within 100 days in 1994, as extremist members of the Hutu majority turned on the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus, vowing to exterminate the Tutsi and their influence on Rwandan society (2, 19944). This massacre was stopped only when the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic face up (RPF) threw down the acting genocidal authorities.Yet, that developed into a nonher blood bath with oer two million of Hutu refugees heading for Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire (current the Democratic Republic of Congo), etc. in effect(p) five days from July 14 to 18, 1994 about 850,000 people crossed the border to Goma in eastern Zaire (2, 19945). Even today these to the great extent, innocent Hutus be deprived of basic human r ights and numerous cases are known when their human rights have been abused by the RPF (that is now at the helm) and they were returned by force to their fatherland where they do not have any rights at all.The major part of the refugees fled out because of fear convinced (owning to Hutu Power propaganda) that the Tutsi were a subhuman race will to enslave and extirpate the Hutu people. However, their genocidaires quickly took over the refugee camps. Instead of safety refugees found intimidation, starvation, tortures and death. International humanitarian organizations were powerless and forced to provide aid through the genocidaires or just leave hundreds of thousands of refugees in trouble and distress.The Rwanda crisis proved how unprepared was the international community to dealing with refugee crises that involved threats to public security and security in the world. What is more, the novel Rwandan government together with their allies from Zaire attacked and wiped the refugee camps off the face of the earth claiming that the camps posed incredible and intolerable threat to Rwandan security (3, 2006). Thousands and thousands of refugees were killed.Thousands more fell victims to cholera that align in along with other contagious diseases (such(prenominal) as dysentery, malaria, etc. ) as a consequence of peoples exhaustion, lack of food and drinking water. superstar may suppose that the described above conflict and crises that follows may definitely be a vivid example of Hobbes rational theory match to which every man lives in fear, as well as the father of rational philosophy did himself. Hobbes once mentioned Fear and I were born twins together (4, 1996 I 11).In his main theoretical work and his masterpiece, the Leviathan, Hobbes suggested that there are two methods of state formation commonwealth by institution commonwealth by science (4, 1996 XIX 147). With regard to the former, Hobbes supposed that at the uprise of civilization, individuals existe d in such state of nature, when life was a perpetual conflict in which men were one anothers enemies. Furthermore, different individuals had relatively equal power, thus being unable to guarantee actual personal security for themselves.As a result, collectible to such hostile environment, the individual, suffers continued fear, and the danger of violent death and a way of life that is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short (4, 1996, I 12). Even more, nature hath do men so equal in faculties of body and mind that no man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he (4, 1996, cardinal 118). In general, this may be regarded as a society without acting laws and authorities with all man have a right to everything, and situation when no action can be unjust (4, 1996, XVII 118).Moreover, the described state of nature leads, according to Hobbes, to the condition of war war of all against all, in which human constantly seeks to destroy each other in an incessant pursuit for power (4, 1996, XVII 118). However, this is not the war we are used to denote with this word. It is rather a condition of awareness about enemies than the act of violence itself. Instead of promoting war, Hobbes emphasizes that war cannot take any benefits or provide any additional security. His purpose is to convince the readers that ruling power would save people from those unnecessary perils caused by the state of nature.Hence, such unfavorable state of nature, as Hobbes puts it, should and will prompt individuals to organize a civil state with a monopolistic sovereign on the head by means of force and coercion. Such monopoly with absolute power will be able to ensure to the individuals safety from other members of their society, as well as encourage from external intrusion. Therefore, from the recognition of the necessity for social order and peace people consent to obey to the sovereign. (4, 1996 XVIII 127).Therefore, it would be more accurat e to consider Hobbess war to be a kind of competition or contest not the real military operations involving victims and bloodshed. It can be compared even to the aspiration between two men who want to attract some woman they both like. Moreover, the author of Leviathan himself drives us to this conclusion by the following words So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition secondly, diffidence thirdly, glory (4, 1996 XVII 119). He explains this again by the human nature, namely its faults all men are by nature provided of notable magnifying glasses (that is their Passions and Self-love,) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance but are destitute of those perspective glasses, (namely Moral and Civil Science,) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided. From this point of view, it seems, to my mind, obvious, that Rwanda civil war is not the case of Hobbes state of war. For Hobbes seizure of power meant improvement of the living conditions of people, even more it was the only way of providing them.The best society organization, from his standpoint, was the commonwealth in the meaning a multitude of people who together consent to a sovereign authority, established by contract to have absolute power over them all, for the purpose of providing peace and common defense (4, 1996 XVII124). As it has been mentioned, the purpose of establishing a commonwealth is to escape the state of nature and to provide peace and the common defense of the people the sovereign is responsible for ensuring this defense (4, 1996 XVII 124).Remarkably, that the so-called sovereign should not necessarily be a single person it (or he as Hobbes uses denotes it) may be comprised of a group of people who purpose at a common aim. Moreover, the sovereigns task is not expressage to promoting safety of the people but according to Hobbes, it covers also promotion of economic w ell-being of the community, sufficient nutrition, etc. By the latter Hobbes implies distribution of materials conducing to life in concoction, or preparation, and (when concocted) in the conveyance of it, by convenient conduits, to the public use. (4, 1996 XVII 126). Furthermore, ruling from the fact that there is no such state that can amply supply itself with all necessary resources, as there is no territory under the dominion of one commonwealth, (except it be of very vast extent,) produceth all the things indispensable for the maintenance of the whole body, Hobbes supposes that the state will import goods or resources from other states through normal trade (4, 1996 XVIII 137). Hence, as we can see the situation with Rwanda coup detat and Hobbes process ad goal of taking power are worlds by.The same refers to the consequences. Whereas the latter should theoretically results in prosperity of the citizens, the former lead, in fact, to the numerous casualties, famine, etc. Furth ermore, in Rwanda there was no realization of rational choices, rather it was the outburst of ethnical hostility than an effort to capture power in order to improve the welfare of the people. In addition, though Hobbes tenet primarily touches upon sovereignty established on the basis of agreement, the scientist maintains that sovereignty reached through acquisition i.e. force entails the same rights and obligations covered by the contract (also called covenant or social contract, which is the act of giving up certain natural rights and transferring them to someone else, on the condition that everyone else involved in making the contract also simultaneously gives up their rights. People agreeing to the contract retain only those rights over others that they are limit for everyone else to retain over them) (4, 1996 XVIII 139). The only difference is the way in which the sovereign comes to power.If a sovereign comes to rule by institution he is back up because people fear each other. And, in contrast, if he comes to rule by acquisition he is supported because people are afraid of him himself, which does not goes apart with the theory of state of nature. Hence, in both cases, the people literally enjoy the same rights, whereas in Rwanda they were completely deprived of any rights. Nevertheless, for Hobbes the second method can be compared with slave-master relationships (without a slave having right to rebel), in Hobbess own wordsThe master of the servant, is master also of all he hath and may pick out the use thereof that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servant, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience that is, of owning, and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same, and cannot accuse him of injury (4, 1996 XVII I 141).David Gauthier also argues that a servant is hardly involved in the decision making calculus of the master instead the servant exists to carry out the formers dictates (5, 2000114). Yet, on the Rwandas example, the people defended and rebelled against their genocidaires, thus, they refused to perform the role of servants presupposed by Hobbes. To sum up, the Rwanda crisis has nothing in common with possible transfer to Hobbes model of state organization. It was founded on the ethnic hostilities that caused in the long run change of ruling power.Moreover, the purpose of the new government, in my opinion, was not the welfare of the people and the country but mere penalize for years of oppression. What is more, the people, though proving to some extent their natural (in accordance with Hobbes) inclination to being enemies to each other, did not resign themselves to the fact that they should be obedient and lowly servants but rebelled instead and fought until the last breath. N evertheless, even if the conflict is motivated by not the ethnic animosity but the rational choice, I will not recommend Hobbes reform of the society organization.At first glance, the objective and functions of his Commonwealth seem to be very promising, for example, preserving the society, establishing an internal order or peace, defending that peace against external violence, etc so that after all individuals can live peaceably (4, 1996 XVIII145). However, I do not believe in such Utopia as for me it is evident that Hobbes state has all features of what is considered or ca turn in future into the totalitarian state (recall those master-slave relationships, overall power of the sovereign, etc.). Our history has already proven that this form of governing is not applicable and is out-of-date with regard to our world and our life. Whatever the conflicts are, and no matter what leaders come to the rule they should entertain in mind that our future is democratic one and there is no pla ce on the earth to dictators and totalitarianism.Bibliography1. Rwanda the Great Genocide Debate. Retrieved from University of Dayton Library on February 14, 2006 http//www. udayton. edu/rwanda/articles/ race murder/noendinsight.html 2. Rwandan apocalypse by Chris McGreal in Goma, Ian Katz from Guardian, Saturday July 23, 1994, p. 4-6. 3. The Rwanda Crisis History of a Genocide 1959-1994, published by Hurst and Company Ltd, 1995. Retrieved on February 14, 2006 from http//www. humanrightsfirst. org 4. Hobbes, Thomas (ed. ) Tuck, Richard Leviathan. Cambridge University Press, 1996 5. Gauthier, D. P. (2000). The Logic of the Leviathan The Moral and Political guess of Thomas Hobbes. Oxford Oxford University Press, p. 114-116.

Student Web Scavenger Hunt

Log on to the University of Phoenix eCampus web page located at https//ecampus. phoenix. edu/ approach/portal/public/login. aspx. Explore the resources available on the site and use them to answer the following questions. WRITING RESOURCES 1. Which tercet reviewing services are available to students by the rivet for Writing Excellence? The plagiarism checker, the tutor review, and write point corrections. 2. Which resource in the Tutorials & Guides section of the Center for Writing Excellence entreats tips about how to initialise a paper?The APA in inningation section publication manual. 3. What are the University of Phoenixs suggested resources for academic writing formatting and grammar guides? (Hint This information is located in the Center for Writing Excellence) Plagiarism checker, tutor review, and write. UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 1. What are the three major article databases found in the University Library? EBSCO host, Thompson Gale Power Search, and Pro Quest. 2. Name three spe cialized article databases in the University Library. Business Insights, Economist. om, and Journal of Leadership Studies. 3. What link would you click to ask a question of the University of Phoenix Librarian? Ask a Librarian. COURSE INFORMATION 1. From your student Web site, how do you access your reading assignments for this course? Materials tab. 2. What chapter from the text Keys to College Studying is part of the reading assignment for Week quadruplet of this course? Chapter 8 3. Where on your student Web site will you be able to find your schedule and course grades for all courses completed to designation?Under program tab and then Schedule and Grades. LEARNING TEAMS 1. What six documents are contained in the Toolkit Essentials section of the learn Team Toolkit? The encyclopedism team handbook, the online campus discipline team handbook, guide to completing the University of Phoenix learning team charter, the learning team log, team evaluation, and team charter. 2. Accord ing to the Learning Team Toolkit section, Why Learning Teams? what are the four essential functions filled by Learning Teams that are especially beneficial to working adult learners?To create a team learning environment that students can share their knowledge from their personal environments and experiences, create the best possible quality with shared assignments by getting the most out of the group, offer support while providing help with life other demands, and help students obtain and use knowledge learn. STUDENT SERVICES 1. What is the phone number for University of Phoenix skilful support? (Hint Use the Help button in the top right corner of the page. ) 1. 877. 832. 4867 2. Where can you find information about who to contact for questions regarding student disabilities?The University deterrent Services section. 3. What three National Testing Programs does the University of Phoenix award credit for? College Level Examination Program, Defense Activities for Non-Traditional Ed ucation Support, and the Excelsior College Examinations. 4. Name one form of misconduct in the Student Code of Conduct. (Hint The Student Code of Conduct is located in the Academic Catalog). Using or being under the bewitch of alcohol or illegal drugs while in class, at campus-sanctioned events, or when meeting with campus personnel.

Deep Water

i i Dedication This report is dedicated to the 11 men who lost their lives on the Deep body of water skyline dress on April 20, 2010 and to their families, in confide that this report forget help minimize the chance of a nonher much(prenominal) disaster ever happening again. Jason Anderson Aaron Dale Burkeen Donald Clark Stephen Curtis Gordon Jones Roy Wyatt Kemp Karl Dale Kleppinger, Jr. Blair Manuel Dewey Revette Shane Roshto Adam Weise ii Ack straightwayledgements We wish to agnize the some individuals and organizations, g every all overnment officials and agencies a uniform that offered their views and insights to the mission.We would especially same(p) to express our gratitude to the Coast Guards Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) for allowing counsel round to participate in its interviews and dissertateions, which was invaluable to the readyness of this report. (A copy of the Coast Guards ISPR report mint be found at the Commissions website at www. v egetable embrocate shedcommission. gov). We would also like to thank Chevron for get alonging the cement visitations that proved so critical to our investigation into the Macondo nearly blow pop(p).Related article why Nations Fail Chapter 5We also thank the Department of Energy, which served as our abideing agency, and all of the Department employees w hose assistance was so essential to the success and functioning of the Commission. In particular, we would like to thank Chris light upher Smith, De put upy Assistant Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, who acted as the Commissions Designated Federal Officer, as well as Elena Melchert, Petroleum guide in the Office of Oil and Gas Re acknowledgment Conservation, who served as the Committee Manager. and most importantly, we are deeply grateful to the citizens of the disjunction who shared their person-to-person xperiences as Commissioners traveled in the region, providing a critical hu musical composition dimension to the dis aster and to our on a lower floortaking, as well as the m each people who bear witnessified at the Commissions hearings, provided public comments, and submitted statements to our website. Together, these contributions greatly informed our work and led to a better report. Thank you one and all. Copy fixht, Restrictions, and Permissions Notice Except as noned herein, materials standed in this report are in the public domain.Public domain information may be freely distributed and copied. However, this report contains illustrations, photographs, and different information contributed by or licence from closed-room access individuals, companies, or organizations that may be protected by U. S. and/or foreign secure laws. Transmission or re takings of items protected by copyright may require the written permission of the copyright owner. When using material or images from this report we ask that you credit this report, as well as the source of the material as indicated in this repor t. Permission to use materials copyrighted by other individuals, companies or organizations must be obtained directly from those sources. This report contains links to military personnely Web sites. Once you access some other site through a link that we provide, you are subject to the use, copyright and licensing restrictions of that site. Neither the government nor the field Commission on the BP/Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and offshore cut (Commission) endorses any of the organizations or views represented by the linked sites unless expressly stated in the report.The Government and the Commission allow in no responsibility for, and exercise no domination over, the content, accuracy or accessibility of the material contained on the linked sites. Cover picture Steadfast TV ISBN 978-0-16-087371-3 iii iii Deep Water The disjunction Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling Report to the President study Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Dri lling January 2011 iv Commission Members Bob Graham, Co-Chair William K. Reilly, Co-Chair Frances Beinecke Donald F. Boesch Terry D. Garcia Cherry A. Murray Fran Ulmer v Table of confine Foreword PART I The Path to Tragedy Chapter 1 Everyone necessitated with the jobwas totally satisfied. The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico vi xiii 1 21 Chapter 2 Each oil color well has its own personality The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the join States Chapter 3 It was like pulling teeth. Oversightand Oversightsin Regulating Deepwater Energy Exploration and Production in the Gulf of Mexico 55 PART II ebullition and Aftermath The Causes and Consequences of the Disaster Chapter 4 But, who cares, its done, end of story, we will in all likelihood be fine and well get a good cement job. The Macondo Well and the gala 87 89 Chapter 5 Youre in it now, up to your neck Response and Containment 129 173 197 Chapter 6 The worst environmental disaste r the States has ever faced. Oiling a Rich Environment Impacts and Assessment Chapter 7 People have plan fatigue . . . theyve been planned to death Recovery and Restoration PART III Lessons intentional Industry, Government, Energy Policy Chapter 8 Safety is not proprietary. Changing Business as Usual 215 217Chapter 9 Develop options for guarding against, and mitigating the impact of, oil spills associated with onshore doing. spend in Safety, Investing in Response, Investing in the Gulf 249 Chapter 10 American Energy Policy and the Future of Offshore Drilling 293 307 356 358 359 362 365 366 368 Endnotes Appendices Appendix A Commission Members Appendix B bring up of Acronyms Appendix C Executive Order Appendix D Commission Staff and Consultants Appendix E List of Commission Meetings Appendix F List of Staff Working Papers Index vi Photo Susan Walsh, Associated PressThe explosion that tore through the Deepwater Horizon useing rig last April 20, as the rigs clustering comple ted working the exploratory Macondo well deep under the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, began a human, economic, and environmental disaster. Eleven crowd members died, and others were seriously injured, as fire engulfed and ultimately destroyed the rig. And, although the nation would not know the full scope of the disaster for weeks, the commencement exercise of more than(prenominal) than four billion barrels of oil began gushing uncontrolled into the Gulfthreatening livelihoods, precious habitats, and even a uncommon way of life.A wanted American landscape, already battered and degraded from eld of mismanagement, faced so far another blow as the oil spread and washed ashore. Five years after Hurricane Katrina, the nation was again transfixed, seemingly helpless, as this vernal tragedy unfolded in the Gulf. The costs from this one industrial accident are not yet fully counted, but it is already clear that the impacts on the regions natural systems and people were enormous, and that economic losses total tens of billions of dollars.On May 22, 2010, President Barack Obama announced the creation of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling an independent, nonpartisan entity, directed to provide a extreme epitome and impartial judgment. The President campaignd the Commission to determine the causes of the disaster, and to improve the countrys ability to oppose to spills, and to recommend reforms to make inshore energy yield safer. And the President said we were to follow the facts wheresoever they led. This report is the result of an intense six-month effort to fulfill the Presidents charge.Foreword vii vii From the outset, the Commissioners have been unconquerable to l prepare the essential lessons so expensively revealed in the tragic loss of life at the Deepwater Horizon and the severe handicaps that ensued. The Commissions steer has been to provide the President, policymakers, persistence, and the Ame rican people a clear, accessible, unblemished, and fair account of the largest oil spill in U. S history the context for the well itself, how the explosion and spill happened, and how application and government scrambled to respond to an unprecedented emergency.This was our first obligation determine what happened, why it happened, and explain it to Americans everywhere. As a result of our investigation, we conclude The detonative loss of the Macondo well could have been prevented. The immediate causes of the Macondo well blowout can be traced to a series of identifiable mistakes made by BP Halliburton, and Transocean that reveal such , systematic failures in risk management that they place in doubt the safety culture of the inviolate perseverance. Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor overnment has been adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the futur e. To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulative care of leasing, energy exploration, and production require reforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiated since the Deepwater Horizon disaster. Fundamental reform will be needed in twain the structure of those in charge of regulative oversight and their internal decisionmaking process to ensure their political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of environmental protection concerns.Because regulatory oversight alone will not be sufficient to ensure adequate safety, the oil and gas industry will need to take its own, one-party steps to increase dramatically safety throughout the industry, including self-policing mechanisms that supplement governmental enforcement. The technology, laws and regulations, and practices for containing, responding to, and cleaning up spills lag behind the real risks associated with deepwater drilling into large, high-pressure reservoirs of oil and gas located far offshore and thousands of feet below the oceans surface.Government must close the existing gap and industry must support quite an than resist that effort. Scientific understanding of environmental conditions in sensitive environments in deep Gulf waters, along the regions coastal habitats, and in areas proposed for more drilling, such as the Arctic, is inadequate. The same is true of the human and natural impacts of oil spills. viii We reach these conclusions, and make necessary recommendations, in a constructive pure tone we aim to promote changes that will make American offshore energy exploration and production far safer, today and in the future.More broadly, the disaster in the Gulf undermined public faith in the energy industry, government regulators, and even our own capability as a nation to respond to crises. It is our hope that a utter(a) and rigorous accounting, along with focused suggestions for reform, can begin the process of restoring confid ence. There is much at stake, not only for the people directly affected in the Gulf region, but for the American people at large. The tremendous resources that exist in entrys our outer continental shelf belong to the nation as a whole.The federal governments authority over the shelf is accordingly plenary, based on its power as both the owner of the resources and in its regulatory capacity as sovereign to protect public health, safety, and welfare. To be allowed to drill on the outer continental shelf is a privilege to be earned, not a private right to be exercised. Complex Systems Almost Always Fail in Complex Ways As the Board that investigated the loss of the capital of South Carolina space shuttle noted, complex systems almost always fail in complex ways. Though it is tempting to single out one crucial slip or point the finger at one bad actor as the cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, any such explanation provides a dangerously incomplete picture of what happenedencour aging the very pleasing of complacency that led to the accident in the first place. Consistent with the Presidents request, this report takes an cavernous view. Why was a corporation drilling for oil in mile-deep water 49 miles off the Louisiana coast? To begin, Americans today consume vast amounts of petroleum productssome 18. 7 million barrels per dayto fuel our parsimoniousness.Unlike many other oil-producing countries, the United States relies on private industrynot a state- possess or -controlled effortto supply oil, natural gas, and indeed all of our energy resources. This basic trait of our private-enterprise system has major implications for how the U. S. government oversees and regulates offshore drilling. It also has advantages in fostering a vigorous and competitive industry, which has led worldwide in advancing the technology of finding and extracting oil and gas. Even as land-based oil production extended as far as the northern Alaska frontier, the oil and gas indu stry began to move offshore.The industry first moved into shallow water and lastly into deepwater, where technological advances have opened up vast new reserves of oil and gas in remote areasin recent decades, much deeper under the waters surface and farther offshore than ever before. The Deepwater Horizon was drilling the Macondo well under 5,000 feet of Gulf water, and then over 13,000 feet under the ocean floor to the hydrocarbon reservoir below. It is a complex, even dazzling, enterprise. The remarkable advances that have propelled the move to deepwater drilling merit comparison with exploring outer space.The Commission is respectful and admiring of the industrys technological capability. ix ix But drilling in deepwater brings new risks, not yet completely addressed by the reviews of where it is safe to drill, what could go wrong, and how to respond if something does go awry. The drilling rigs themselves bristle with potentially dangerous machinery. The deepwater environment is cold, pertinacious, distant, and under high pressuresand the oil and gas reservoirs, when found, exist at even higher pressures (thousands of pounds per satisfying inch), compounding the risks if a well gets out of control.The Deepwater Horizon and Macondo well vividly illustrated all of those very real risks. When a failure happens at such depths, getting even control is a formidable engineering challengeand the costs of failure, we now know, can be catastrophically high. In the years before the Macondo blowout, neither industry nor government adequately addressed these risks. Investments in safety, containment, and response equipment and practices failed to keep pace with the rapid move into deepwater drilling.Absent major crises, and put upn the remarkable financial re crimps available from deepwater reserves, the argumentation culture succumbed to a false sense of security. The Deepwater Horizon disaster exhibits the costs of a culture of complacency. The Commission examine d in great detail what went wrong on the rig itself. Our investigative staff uncovered a wealth of specific information that greatly enhances our understanding of the factors that led to the explosion. The separately published report of the important counsel (a summary of the findings is presented in Chapter 4) offers the fullest account yet of what happened on the rig and why.There are recurring themes of missed warning signals, failure to share information, and a customary lack of appreciation for the risks involved. In the view of the Commission, these findings suck up the importance of organizational culture and a consistent commitment to safety by industry, from the highest management levels on passel. * But that complacency affected government as well as industry. The Commission has documented the weaknesses and the inadequacies of the federal regulation and oversight, and made important recommendations for changes in intelligent authority, regulations, investments in exp ertise, and management.The Commission also looked at the effectiveness of the response to the spill. There were remarkable instances of dedication and heroism by individuals involved in the rescue and cleanup. a good deal was done welland thanks to a combination of good luck and hard work, the worst-case scenarios did not all come to pass. But it is impossible to argue that the industry or the country was prepared for a disaster of the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Twenty years after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska, the same crude(a) response technologiesbooms, dispersants, and skimmerswere used, to limited effect.On-the-ground short approachings in the joint public-private response to an overwhelming spill like that resulting from the blowout of the Macondo well are now evident, and demand public and private investment. So do the weaknesses in local, state, and federal coordination revealed by the emergency. Both government and industry failed to anticipate and p revent this catastrophe, and failed again to be prepared to respond to it. *The foreland counsels investigation was no doubt complicated by the lack of subpoena power. Nonetheless, Chief Counsel Bartlit did an extraordinary job building the ledger and interpreting what he learned.He used his considerable powers of persuasion along with other tools at his disposal to engage the involved companies in constructive and informative exchanges. x If we are to make future deepwater drilling safer and more environmentally responsible, we will need to address all these deficiencies together a piecemeal approach will surely submit us vulnerable to future crises in the communities and natural environments most exposed to offshore energy exploration and production. The Deepwater Drilling Prospect The damage from the spill and the impact on the people of the Gulf has guided our work from the very beginning.Our first action as a Commission was to visit the Gulf region, to learn directly from th ose most affected. We heard deeply moving accounts from oystermen witnessing multi-generation family businesses slipping away, fishermen and tourism proprietors extending the brunt of an ill-founded stigma affecting everything related to the Gulf, and oil-rig workers dealing with mounting bills and jeopardize home foreclosures, their means of support temporarily derailed by a blanket drilling moratorium, shutting down all deepwater drilling rigs, including those not implicated in the BP spill.Indeed, the centrality of oil and gas exploration to the Gulf economic system is not widely appreciated by many Americans, who enjoy the benefits of the energy essential to their transportation, but bear none of the direct risks of its production. Within the Gulf region, however, the role of the energy industry is well dumb and accepted. The notion of clashing interestsof energy extraction versus a natural-resource economy with bountiful fisheries and tourist amenitiesmisses the extent to w hich the energy industry is woven into the fabric of the Gulf culture and economy, providing thousands of jobs and essential public revenues.Any discussion of the future of offshore drilling cannot ignore these economic realities. But those benefits have imposed their costs. The bayous and wetlands of Louisiana have for decades suffered from destructive alteration to accommodate oil exploration. The Gulf ecosystem, a unique American asset, is likely to continue silently washing away unless decisive action is taken to start the work of creating a sustainably healthy and productive landscape. No one should be deluded that restoration on the scale needful will occur quickly or cheaply.Indeed, the experience in restoring other large, sensitive regionsthe Chesapeake Bay, the Everglades, the smashing Lakesindicates that progress will require coordinated federal and state actions, a dedicated funding source, long-term monitoring, and a vocal and engaged citizenry, supported by robust no n-governmental groups, scientific research, and more. We advocate beginning such an effort, seriously and soon, as a suitable response to the damage and disruption caused by the Deepwater Horizon emergency.It is a fair recognition not only of the costs that energy exploitation in the Gulf has, for decades, imposed on the landscape and habitatsand the other economic activities they supportbut also of the certainty that Americans will continue to develop the regions offshore energy resources. For the simple fact is that the bulk of our newly notice petroleum reserves, and the best prospects for future discoveries, lie not on land, but under water. To date, we have xi xi made the decision as a nation to exploit the Gulf s offshore energy resourcesruling much of the Florida, Atlantic, and Pacific coasts out of bounds for drilling.The choice of how aggressively to exploit these resources, wherever they may be found, has profound implications for the future of U. S. energy policy, for ou r need to understand and assure the fair play of fragile environmental resources, and for the way Americans think nearly our economy and our security. Although much work is being done to improve the fuelefficiency of vehicles and to develop alternative fuels, we cannot realistically walk away from these offshore oil resources in the near future. So we must be much better prepared to exploit such resources with far greater care. The Commission and Its WorkWhile we took a broad view of the spill, it could not be exhaustive. There is fluent much we do not knowfor instance, the blowout preventer, the last line of defense against loss of well control, is lifelessness being canvas and the Deepwater Horizon itself, after its explosive destruction, remained out of reach during our investigation. The understandable, immediate need to provide answers and concrete suggestions trumped the benefits of a longer, more comprehensive investigation. And as we know from other spills, their enviro nmental consequences play out over decadesand often in unexpected ways.Instead, the Commission focused on areas we thought most likely to inform practical recommendations. Those recommendations are presented in the spirit of transforming America into the global leader for safe and effective offshore drilling trading operations. Just as this Commission learned from the experiences of other nations in developing our recommendations, the lessons learned from the Deepwater Horizon disaster are not confined to our own government and industry, but relevant to rest of the world. We wish we could articulate that our recommendations make a recurrence of a disaster like the Macondo blowout impossible. We do not have that power.No one can eliminate all risks associated with deepwater exploration. But when exploration occurs, particularly in sensitive environments like the Gulf of Mexico or the Arctic, the country has an obligation to make responsible decisions regarding the benefits and ris ks. The report is divided into deuce-ace sections. Chapters 1 through 3 describe the events of April 20th on the Deepwater Horizon, and, more important, the events leading up to it in the preceding decadesespecially how the dramatic intricacy of deepwater drilling in the Gulf was not met by regulatory oversight capable of ensuring the safety of those drilling operations.Chapters 4 through 7 lay out the results of our investigation in detail, highlighting the crucial issues we believe must inform policy personnel casualty forward the specific engineering and operating choices made in drilling the Macondo well, the attempts to contain and respond to the oil spill, and the impacts of the spill on the regions natural resources, economy, and peoplein the context of the progressive degradation of the Mississippi Delta environment. xii Chapters 8 through 10 present our recommendations for reforms in business practices, regulatory oversight, and broader policy concerns.We recognize that the improvements we advocate all come with costs and all will take time to implement. But inaction, as we are deeply aware, runs the risk of real costs, too in more lost lives, in broad damage to the regional economy and its long-term viability, and in further tens of billions of dollars of avoidable clean-up costs. Indeed, if the clear challenges are not addressed and another disaster happens, the entire offshore energy enterprise is threatenedand with it, the nations economy and security.We suggest a better option build from this tragedy in a way that makes the Gulf more resilient, the countrys energy supplies more secure, our workers safer, and our cherished natural resources better protected. Our Thanks and Dedication We thank President Obama for this opportunity to learn thoroughly about(predicate) the crisis, and to share our findings with the American public. We deeply appreciate the effort people in the affected Gulf regions made to tell us about their experiences, and the time and preparation witnesses before the Commission dedicated to their presentations.We have come to respect the seriousness with which our fleeow Commissioners assumed our joint responsibilities, and their diverse expertise and perspectives that helped make its work thorough and productive. On their behalf, we wish to recognize the extraordinary work the Commissions staffscientists, lawyers, engineers, policy analysts, and more performed, under demanding deadlines, to make our inquiries broad, deep, and effective and we especially highlight the leadership contributions of Richard Lazarus, executive director, and Fred Bartlit, chief counsel.Together, they have fulfilled an extraordinary public service. Finally, to the American people, we reiterate that extracting the energy resources to fuel our cars, heat and light our homes, and power our businesses can be a dangerous enterprise. Our national reliance on fossil fuels is likely to continue for some timeand all of us reap benefit s from the risks taken by the men and women working in energy exploration. We owe it to them to ensure that their working environment is as safe as possible. We dedicate this effort to the 11 of our fellow citizens who lost their lives in the Deepwater Horizon explosion.Bob Graham, Co-Chair William K. Reilly, Co-Chair xiii xiii xiii Part I The Path to Tragedy On April 20, 2010, the 126 workers on the BP Deepwater Horizon were going about the routines of completing an exploratory oil wellunaware of impending disaster. What unfolded would have unknown impacts shaped by the Gulf regions distinctive cultures, institutions, and geographyand by economic forces resulting from the unique coexistence of energy resources, bountiful fisheries and wildlife, and coastal tourism.The oil and gas industry, long lured by Gulf reserves and public incentives, increasingly developed and deployed new technologies, at ever-larger scales, in pursuit of valuable energy supplies in increasingly deeper wate rs farther from the coastline. Regulators, however, failed to keep pace with the industrial expansion and new technologyoften because of industrys resistance to more effective oversight. The result was a serious, and ultimately inexcusable, shortfall in supervision of offshore drilling that played out in the Macondo well blowout and the catastrophic oil spill that followed.Chapters 1 through 3 describe the interplay of private industry and public oversight in the distinctive Gulf deepwater context the conditions that governed the deployment of the Deepwater Horizon and the drilling of the Macondo well. Chapter One 1 1 Chapter One Everyone involved with the job . . . was completely satisfied. . . The Deepwater Horizon, the Macondo Well, and Sudden Death on the Gulf of Mexico At 545 a. m. on Tuesday, April 20, 2010, a Halliburton Company cementing engineer sent an e-mail from the rig Deepwater Horizon, in the Gulf of Mexico off the Louisiana coast, to his colleague in Houston.He had good news We have completed the job and it went well. 1 Outside in the Gulf, it was heretofore aphoticbeyond the glare of the floodlights on the gargantuan rig, the four decks of which towered above the blue-green water on four huge white columns, all floating on massive pontoons. The oil derrick rose over 20 stories above the top deck. Up on the noseband on the main deck, twain officers monitored the satelliteguided dynamic post system, controlling thrusters so powerful that they could keep the 33,000-ton Deepwater Horizon centered over a well even in high seas.The rigs industrial hum and loud mechanical noises punctuated the sea air as a slight breeze blew in off the water. The clump worked on Pride of the Transocean cash in ones chips of offshore drilling rigs, Deepwater Horizon rides solacely on station 40 miles off the Louisiana coast. The $560-million-dollar rig, under engross to BP was putting the finishing touches on the oil companys , 18,000-foot-deep Macondo well when it blew out and escaping methane gas exploded. Eleven workers died in the inferno. According to the governments estimates, by the time the well was sealed months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled into the Gulf. lt Photo courtesy of Transocean 2 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling the well bore, aiming always to keep the pressure inside the well balancing the force exerted by the surrounding ocean bottom. 2 By the time the Halliburton engineer had arrived at the rig four days earlier to help cement in the two-and-a-half-mile-deep Macondo well, some crew members had dubbed it the well from hell. 3 Macondo was not the first well to earn that nickname4 like many deepwater wells, it had proved complicated and challenging.As they drilled, the engineers had to modify plans in response to their increasing knowledge of the precise features of the geologic formations thousands of feet below. Deepwater drilling is an inevitably tough, demanding job, requiring tremendous engineering expertise. BP drilling engineer Brian Morel, who had designed the Macondo well with other BP engineers including Mark Hafle, was also on board to observe the final stages of work at the well. 5 In an April 14 e-mail, Morel had lamented to his colleagues, this has been a wickednessmare well which has everyone all over the place. 6 BP and its corporate partners on the well, Anadarko Petroleum and MOEX USA, had, according to government reports, budgeted $96. 2 million and 51 days of work to drill the Macondo well in Mississippi Canyon Block 252. 7 They discovered a large reservoir of oil and gas, but drilling had been challenging. As of April 20, BP and the Macondo well were almost six weeks behind schedule and more than $58 million over budget. 8 The Deepwater Horizon was not originally meant to drill Macondo. Another giant rig, the Marianas, had initiated work on the well the previous October. Drilling had reached more than 9,000 feet below the ocean surface (4,000 feet below the seabed), with another 9,000 feet to go to pay zone (the oil and gas reservoir), when Hurricane Ida so battered the rig on November 9 that it had to be towed in for repair. Both Marianas and Deepwater Horizon were semisubmersible rigs owned by Transocean, founded in Louisiana in 1919 as Danciger Oil & Refining Co. and now the worlds largest contractor of offshore drilling rigs. 10 In 2009, Transoceans global fleet produced revenues of $11. 6 billion. 1 Transocean had consolidated its dominant position in the industry in November 2007 by merging with rival GlobalSantaFe. 12 Deepwater Horizon, built for $350 million,13 was seen as the outstanding rig in Transoceans fleet leasing its services reportedly cost as much as $1 million per day. Since Deepwater Horizons 2001 maiden voyage to the Gulf, it had been under contract to London-based BP (formerly known as British Petroleum). By 2010, after numerous acquisitions, BP had become the wo rlds fourth-largest corporation (based on revenue)14 producing more than 4 million barrels of oil daily from 30 countries. Ten percent of BPs output came from the Gulf of Mexico, where BP America (headquartered in Houston) was the largest producer. But BP had a tarnished reputation for safety. Among other BP accidents, 15 workers died in a 2005 explosion at its Texas City, Texas, refinery in 2006, thither was a major oil spill from a badly corroded BP pipeline in Alaska. * *A barrel equals 42 gallons. * * * Chapter One 3 3 Deepwater Horizon had arrived at the Macondo lease site on January 31, at 215 p. m. It was 55 degrees, chilly and clearthe iniquity of a full moon.About 126 people were aboard approximately 80 Transocean employees, a few BP men, cafeteria and laundry workers, and a changing group of workers contracted for specialized jobs. Depending on the status of the well, these might include Halliburton cementers, remains loggers from Sperry Sun (a Halliburton subsidiary), mud engineers from M-I SWACO (a subsidiary of Schlumberger, an international oilfield services provider), remotely operated vehicle technicians from Oceaneering, or tank cleaners and technicians from the OCS Group. The offices and living quarters were on the two bottom decks of the rig.Helicopters flew in and out regularly with workers and supplies, landing on the top-deck helipad, and service ships made regular visits. At its new Macondo assignment, Deepwater Horizon floated in 4,992 feet of water salutary beyond the gentle side of the continental shelf in the Mississippi Canyon. 15 The seabed far below was near-freezing, visible to the crew only via cameras mounted on the rigs subsea remotely operated vehicle. Another two and a half miles below the seabed was the prize BP sought a large reservoir of oil and gas from the fondness Miocene era trapped in a porous rock formation at temperatures exceeding 200 degrees. 6 These deepwater hydrocarbon fields, buried far below the seabed not just in the Gulf, but in other oil-rich zones around the world, toowere the brave new oil frontier. The size of some deepwater fields was so huge that the oil industry had nicknamed those with a billion barrels or more elephants. 17 Drilling for oil had always been hard, dirty, dangerous work, combining dim machinery and volatile hydrocarbons extracted at high pressures. Since 2001, the Gulf of Mexico workforce35,000 people, working on 90 big drilling rigs and 3,500 production platformshad suffered 1,550 injuries, 60 deaths, and 948 fires and explosions. 8 The rig neer slept. Most workers on Deepwater Horizon, from BPs top company man down to the roustabouts, put in a 12-hour night or day shift, working three instantly weeks on and then having three weeks off. Rig workers made good money for the dangerous work and long stints away from home and family. Top rig and management jobs paid well into six figures. On the morning of April 20, Robert Kaluza was BPs day-shift company m an on the Deepwater Horizon. On board for the first time, he was inspection and repair for four days as a relief man for Ronald Sepulvado, a veteran well-site leader on the rig.Sepulvado had flown back to shore April 16 for a required well-control class. 19 During the rigs daily 730 a. m. operations conference call to BP in Houston, engineer Morel discussed the good news that the final cement job at the bottom of the Macondo well had gone fine. 20 To ensure the job did not have problems, a three-man Schlumberger team was scheduled to fly out to the rig later that day, able to perform a suite of tests to examine the wells new bottom cement seal. 21 4 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore DrillingAccording to the BP teams plan, if the cementing went smoothly, as it had, they could skip Schlumbergers cement evaluation. Generally, the completion rig would perform this test when it reopened the well to produce the oil the exploratory drilling had discove red. The decision was made to send the Schlumberger team home on the 1100 a. m. helicopter, thus frugality time and the $128,000 fee. As BP Wells Team Leader John Guide noted, Everyone involved with the job on the rig site was completely satisfied with the cementing job. 22 At 852 a. m. , Morel e-mailed the Houston office to reiterate Just wanted to let everyone know the cement job went well. Pressures stayed low, but we had full returns on the entire jobWe should be coming out of the hole well shortly. At 1014 a. m. , David Sims, BPs new drilling operations manager in charge of Macondo, e-mailed to say, Great job guys * * * * The rest of the day would be devoted to a series of further tests on the wellpositiveand negative-pressure testsin preparation for temporary abandonment. * During the positive-pressure test, the drill crew would increase the pressure inside the steel type and seal assembly to be sure they were intact. The negative-pressure test, by contrast, would reduce t he pressure inside the well in order to simulate its state after the Deepwater Horizon had packed up and moved on. If pressure increased inside the well during the negative-pressure test, or if fluids flowed up from the well, that would indicate a well integrity problema leak of fluids into the well.Such a leak would be a worrisome sign that somewhere the casing and cement had been breachedin which case remedial work would be needed to reestablish the wells integrity. At 1043 a. m. , Morel, about to renounce the rig on the helicopter with the Schlumberger team, sent a short e-mail laying out his plan for conducting the days tests of the wells integrity and subsequent temporary abandonment procedures. Few had seen the plans details when the rig supervisors and members of the drill team gathered for the rigs daily 1100 a. m. pre-tour meeting in the cinema room. Basically we go over whats going to be taking place for today on the rig and the drill floor, said Douglas Brown, chief mech anic. 23 During the rig meeting, the crew on the drill floor was conducting the Macondo wells positive-pressure test. 24 The positive-pressure test on the casing was reassuring, a success. 25 There was reason for the mood on the rig to be upbeat. Ross Skidmore, a subsea engineer explained, When you run the last string of casing, and youve got it cemented, its landed out, and a test was done on it, you say, This job, were at the end of it, were going to be okay. 26 At noon, the drill crew began to run drill pipe into the well in preparation for the negativepressure test later that evening. 27 By now, it was a sunny afternoon. Transoceans top men on the rig, prize Harrell and Captain Curt Kuchta, were standing together near the helipad, watching a helicopter gently land. Kuchta had come in from New Orleans just * maverick abandonment describes the process, after successful exploration, for securing the well until the production platform can be brought in for the purpose of extractin g the oil and gas from the reservoir. Chapter One 5 5 that morning to begin his three-week hitch.Harrell was the top Transocean man on the rig whenas nowthe well was latched up. Captain Kuchta, who had served on the Deepwater Horizon since June 2008, was in command when the vessel was unlatched and thus once again a maritime vessel. 28 The helicopter landed, the doors opened, and four Houston executives stepped out to begin their 24-hour management visibility tour. 29 Harrell and Kuchta greeted the VIPs. 30 Two were from Transocean Buddy Trahan, vice president and operations manager for assets, and Daun Winslow, a one-time assistant driller who had worked his way up to operations manager.BPs representatives were David Sims, the new drilling operations manager (he had sent the congratulatory e-mail about the cement just that morning), and Pat OBryan, vice-president for drilling and completions, Gulf of Mexico Deepwater. 31 At about 400 p. m. , Harrell began his escorted tour of the Deepwater Horizon for the VIPs. 32 He was joined by Chief Engineer Steve Bertone, on board since 2003, and senior toolpusher Randy Ezell, another top man on the rig. 33 Like Harrell, Ezell was an offshore veteran. He had worked for 23 years with Transocean34 and was now the senior man in charge of the drilling floor.He had been on the rig for years. If any people knew this rig, they were Harrell, Bertone, and Ezell they showed the VIPs around. At 500 p. m. , the rig crew, including toolpusher Wyman wheeler, began the negativepressure test. 35 After bleeding pressure from the well, the crew would close it off to check whether the pressure within the drill pipe would remain steady. But the pressure repeatedly built back up. As the crew conducted the test, the drill shack grew crowded. 36 The night crew began arriving to relieve the day shift, and Harrell brought the VIPs through as part of their tour. 7 There was quite a few people in there, said Transoceans Winslow. I tapped Dewey Revette on the shoulder. He was the driller master. I said, Hey, hows it going, Dewey? You got everything under control here? And he said, Yes, sir. And there seemed to be a discussion going on about some pressure or a negative test. And I said to open up Harrell and Randy Ezell, Looks like theyre having a discussion here. Maybe you could give them some assistance. And they happily agreed to that. 38 Bertone took over the tour, wandering on to look at the moon pool, down toward the pontoons and the thrusters. 9 The two shifts continued to discuss how to proceed. It was about 600 p. m. Jason Anderson, a tool pusher, sullen to Ezell and said, Why dont you go eat? 40 Ezell had originally planned to attend a meeting with the VIPs at 700 p. m. He replied, I can go eat and come back. 41 6 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Anderson was from Bay City, Texas, and had been on the rig since it was built he was highly respected as a man who und erstood the finer points of deepwater well control.This was his final shift on the Deepwater Horizon he had been promoted to teaching in Transoceans well-control school, and he was scheduled to fly out the beside day. He told Ezell, Man, you aint got to do that. Ive got this. Dont worry about it. If I have any problems at all with this test Ill give you a call. 42 I knew Jason well, said Ezell, Ive worked with him for all those years, eight or nine years. He was just like a brother. So I had no doubt that if he had any indication of any problem or difficulty at all he would have called me. So I went ahead and ate. I did attend the meeting with the dignitaries. 43 Wheeler was convinced that something wasnt right, recalled Christopher Pleasant, a subsea supervisor. Wheeler couldnt believe the explanations he was hearing. But his shift was up. 44 Don Vidrine, the company man coming on the evening shift, eventually said that another negative test had to be done. 45 This time the crew m embers were able to get the pressure down to zero on a different pipe, the kill line, but still not for the drill pipe, which continued to show elevated pressure. 46 According to BP witnesses, Anderson said he had seen this before and explained away the anomalous reading as the bladder effect. 47 Whether for this reason or another, the men in the shack determined that no flow from the open kill line equaled a successful negative-pressure test. 48* It was time to get on with the rest of the temporary abandonment process. Kaluza, his shift over, headed off duty. 49 At 700 p. m. , after dinner, the VIPs had gathered in the one-third floor conference room with the rigs leadership. According to BPs Patrick OBryan, the Deepwater Horizon was the best performing rig that we had in our fleet and in the Gulf of Mexico.And I believe it was one of the top performing rigs in all the BP floater fleets from the standpoint of safety and drilling performance. OBryan, at his new job just four month s, was on board in part to learn what made the rig such a stand-out. 50 Despite all the crews troubles with this latest well,51 they had not had a single lost-time incident in seven years of drilling. 52 The Transocean managers discussed with their BP counterparts the backlog of rig maintenance. A kinsfolk 2009 BP safety audit had produced a 30-page list of 390 items requiring 3,545 man-hours of work. 3 The managers reviewed upcoming maintenance schedules and discussed efforts to reduce dropped objects and personal injuries on a rig with cranes, multiple decks, and complicated heavy(p) machinery, errant objects could be deadly. 54 Around 900 p. m. , Transoceans Winslow proposed they all go visit the bridge, which had not been part of their earlier tour. According to David Sims, the bridge was kind of an impressive place if you hadnt been therelots of screenslots of technology. 55 The four * The precise content of this particular conversation is disputed and is considered more ful ly in Chapter 4.Chapter One 7 7 men walked outside. The Gulf air was warm and the water calm as glass. Beyond the glare of the rigs lights, the night sky glimmered with stars. * * * * After concluding that the negative-pressure test was successful, the drilling crew prepared to set a cement plug56 deep in the well3,000 feet below the top of the well. 57 They reopened the blowout preventer and began pumping seawater down the drill pipe to plunder the mud and spacer* from the riser (the pipe that connected the rig to the well assembly on the seafloor below). 8 When the spacer appeared up at the surface, they stopped pumping because the fluid had to be tested to make sure it was clean enough to dump it in the Gulf, now that it had journ shopping malld down into the well and back. By 915 p. m. , the crew began discharging the spacer overboard. 59 * * * * Inside the bridge, Captain Kuchta welcomed visitors Sims, OBryan, Trahan, and Winslow. 60 The two dynamic-positioning officers, Yancy Keplinger and Andrea Fleytas, were also on the bridge. 61 Keplinger was bounteous the visitors a tour of the bridge while Fleytas was at the desk station. 2 The officers explained how the rigs thrusters kept the Deepwater Horizon in place above the well, showed off the radars and incumbent meters, and offered to let the visiting BP men try their hands at the rigs dynamic-positioning video simulator. 63 Winslow watched as the crew programmed in 70-knot winds and 30-foot seas, and hypothetically put two of the rigs six thrusters out of commission. Then they put the simulator into manual mode and let Sims work the hand controls to maintain the rigs location. Keplinger was advising about how much thrust to use.Winslow decided it was a good moment to go grab a quick cup of coffee and a smoke. He walked down to the rigs smoking area, poured some coffee, and lit his cigarette. 64 * * * * Senior Toolpusher Randy Ezell left the evening meeting with BP feeling enjoyd at their praise on ho w good a job we had doneHow proud they were of the rig. He stopped in at the galley to get a beverage before continuing to his office. At 920, he called Anderson up on the rig floor and asked, How did your negative test go? 65 Anderson It went good. . . . We bled it off. We watched it for 30 transactions and we had no flow. Ezell What about your displacement? Hows it going? Anderson Its going fine. . . . It wont be much longer and we ought to have our spacer back. * As expound more fully in Chapter 4, a spacer is a liquid that separates drilling mud used during the drilling operations from the seawater that is pumped in to displace the mud once drilling is complete. 8 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Ezell Do you need any help from me? Anderson No, man. . . . Ive got this. . . . Go to bed. Ive got it. Ezell concluded Okay. 66 Ezell walked to his cabin. He had worked with Anderson since the rig came from the shipyard. He had comp lete confidence in him. Jason was very acute on what he did. . . he probably had more experience as far as shutting in for kicks than any individual on the Deepwater Horizon. So Ezell prepared for bed, called his wife, and then turned off the lights to watch a bit of TV before going to sleep. 67 * * * * Up on the bridge, OBryan was taking his turn on the simulator. 68 Sims had stepped to the opposite side of the bridge when he felt a distinct high-frequency vibration. 9 Captain Kuchta looked up and remarked Whats that? He strode to the port-side door and opened it. 70 Outside, OBryan could see the supply vessel Bankston glistening with what looked like drilling mud. 71 The captain shut the door and told everybody to stay inside. 72 Then there began a hissing noise. 73 * * * * BPs Vidrine had headed back to his office to do paperwork. He had been there about 10 to 15 transactions when the phone rang. It was Anderson, who reported they were getting mud back and were diverting to t he gas buster. Vidrine grabbed his hard hat and started for the drill floor.By the time he got outside, there was mud and seawater blowing everywhere, there was a mud film on the deck. I decided not to continue and came back across. 74 * * * * Down in Ezells cabin, he was still watching TV when his phone rang. It was assistant driller Steve Curtis calling, also from the rig floor. We have a situation. The well is blown out. . . . We have mud going to the crown. Ezell was horrified. Do yall have it shut in? 75 Curtis Jason is shutting it in now. . . Randy, we need your help. Ezell Steve, Ill beIll be right there. 76 He put on his coveralls, pulled his socks on, and opened the door to go across the hall to his office for his boots and hard hat. Once in the hall, a tremendous explosion blew me probably 20 feet against a bulkhead, against the wall in that office. And I remember then that the lights went out, power went out. I could hear everything deathly calm. 77 * * * * Chapter One 9 9 Up on the main deck, gantry crane operator Micah Sandell was working with the roustabouts. I seen mud shooting all the way up to the derrick. . . . Then it just quit. . . I took a deep breath thinking that Oh, they got it under control. Then all the sudden the. . . mud started coming out of the degasser. . . so strong and so loud that it just filled up the whole back deck with a gassy smoke. . . loud enough. . . its like taking an air hose and sticking it in your ear. Then something exploded. . . that started the first fire on the steer side of the derrick. 78 Sandell jumped up and turned off the crane cabs air conditioner, worried that the gas would come in. And about that time everything in the back just exploded at one time. It. . . knocked me to the back of the cab. I fell to the floor. . put my hands over my head and I just said, No, God, no. Because I thought that was it. 79 Then the flames pulled back from his crane and began to shoot straight up, roaring up and over t he 20-story derrick. 80 * * * * Down in the engine control room, Chief Mechanic Douglas Brown, an Army veteran employed by Transocean, was choice out the nightly log and equipment hours. He had spent the day fixing a saltwater pipe in one of the pontoons. First, he noticed an passing loud air leak sound. Then a gas alarm sounded, followed by more and more alarms wailing.In the midst of that noise, Brown noticed soul over the radio. I heard the captain or chief mate, Im not sure who, make an announcement to the standby ride, the Bankston, saying we were in a well-control situation. 81 The vessel was ordered to back off to 500 meters. 82 Now Brown could hear the rigs engines revving. I heard them revving up higher and higher and higher. Next I was expecting the engine trips to take over. . . . That did not happen. After that the power went out. Seconds later, an explosion ripped through the soot black control room, hurtling him against the control panel, blast away the floor.B rown fell through into a subfloor full of cable trays and wires. A second huge explosion roared through, collapsing the ceiling on him. All around in the dark he could hear people screaming and crying for help. 83 Dazed and buried in debris, he pulled himself out of the subfloor hole. In front of him appeared mike Williams, chief electronic technician, blood pouring from a wound on his brow, crawling over the rubble, screaming that he had to get out. 84 * * * * Steve Bertone, the rigs chief engineer, had been in bed, reading the first sentence of his book, when he noticed an odd noise. As it progressively got louder, it sounded like a freight train coming through my bedroom and then there was a thumping sound that consecutively got much faster and with each thump, I felt the rig very shake. 85 After a loud boom, the lights went out. 86 He leapt out of bed, opening his door to let in the emergency hall light so he could get dressed. 87 The overhead public-address system crackled t o life Fire. Fire. Fire. 88 10 National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling The air smelled and tasted of some kind of fuel.A second explosion roared through, flinging Bertone across his room. He stood up, pulled on his coveralls, work boots, and hard hat, and grabbed a life vest. Out in the hall, clogged with debris from blown-out walls and ceilings, four or five men stood in shock. Bertone yelled to them to go out by the port forward or starboard forward spiral staircases and report to their emergency stations. He ran toward the bridge. 89 He went to the portside back computer, the dynamic positioning system responsible for maintaining the rigs position. I observed that we had no engines, no thrusters, no power whatsoever.I picked up the phone which was right there and I tried calling extension 2268, which is the engine control room. There was no dial tone whatsoever. It was then that Bertone looked out to the bridges starboard window. I was fu lly expecting to see steel and pipe and everything on the rig floor. When I looked out the window, I saw fire from derrick leg to derrick leg and as high as I could see. At that point, I recognise that we had just had a blowout. 90 Fleytas hit the general alarm. 91 The alarm went off Report to emergency stations and lifeboats. The rig crew heard This is not a drill. This is not a drill. 92 Fleytas, realizing that the rig had not yet issued a Mayday call, sent it out. 93 Out in the dark of the Gulf, three friends on the 31-foot Ramblin Wreck were out on the water for a day of tuna fishing. 94 Around 945 p. m. , Bradley Shivers trained his binoculars at a brilliant light in the distance and realized it must be an oil rig on fire. 95 On their radio, they heard, Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, this is the Deepwater Horizon. We are on fire. 96 At that moment they heard and felt a concussive sonic boom. 97 The Ramblin Wreck headed to the scene, their first tuna outing of the year cut short. 8 Bertone was now back to his station on the bridge, thinking, The engines should be starting up because in approximately 25 to 30 seconds two engines start up, come online. . . . There was still no power of any kind. No engines starting no indication of engines starting. 99 At that moment, the water-tight door to his left banged open and he heard someone say, The engine room ECR engine control room and pump room are gone. They are all gone. Bertone turned around, What do you mean gone? The man speaking was so coated in blood Bertone had no idea who he was. Then he recognized the articulation. It was Mike Williams.Bertone saw how badly lacerated Williamss forehead was, grabbed a roll of toilet paper from the bathroom, pressed it on the wound to staunch the bleeding, and ordered, Hold this here. 100 Then he went back to his station and looked at his screen. There was still nothing, no engines starting, no thrusters running, nothing. We were still a dead ship. 101 He heard the water- tight door slam again and saw another man soaked in blood, holding a rag to his head, repeating, Im hurt. Im hurt bad, Chief. Im hurt real bad. It was the voice of Brent Mansfield, a Transocean marine engineer. Bertone pulled back MansfieldsChapter One 11 11 hand holding a rag, saw the head wound, and ran over to the bridge door and yelled down to the life-vessel area, We need a medic up here now. 102 * * * * After the explosion, Randy Ezell lay buried under the blown-out walls and ceilings of the toolpushers office. The room was dark and smoky, the debris atop him so heavy he could barely move. On the third try, adrenalin kicked in. I told myself, Either you get up or youre going to lay here and die. Pulling hard on his right leg, he extricated it and tried to stand up. That was the wrong thing to do because I direct stuck my head into smoke. . . I dropped back down. I got on my hands and knees and for a few moments I was totally disoriented. He wondered which way the door was. He felt air. He crawled through the debris toward the door and realized the air was methane. He could feel the droplets. He was crawling slowly atop the rubble in the pitch-black hall when he felt a body. 103 Ezell then saw a bobbing beam of light. Stan Carden, the electrical supervisor, came round the corner. Carden had a light that bounced off shattered walls and collapsed ceilings in the pitch-black corridor, giving glimpses into rooms on each side wrecked by the power of the blast. 04 Stumbling into what was left of the hall was Offshore Installation Manager Jimmy Harrell, who had been in the shower when the rig exploded105 he had donned coveralls, and now was groping his way out of what was left of his room. I think Ive got something in my eyes, Harrell said. He had no shoes. I got to see if I can find me some shoes. 106 Carden and Ezell tugged debris off the man they now recognized as Wyman Wheeler. Chad Murray, Transoceans Chief Electrician, also appeared in the hall with a flashlight, and was immediately dispatched to find a stretcher for the injured man. 07 Believing it would save time to walk Wheeler out, Ezell slung Wheelers arm around his shoulder. Wheeler groaned, Set me down . . . . Yall go on. Save yourself. 108 Ezell said, No, were not going to leave you. Were not going to leave you in here. 109 Just then, they heard another voice from under the rubble God help me. Somebody please help me. Near the ruins of the maintenance office the flashlight picked out a pair of feet jutting from the rubble. It was the visiting Transocean manager, Buddy Trahan, badly injured. By now Murray was there with a stretcher.Ezell, Carden, and Murray dragged away the remains of ceilings and walls trapping Trahan and loaded him on the stretcher. Carden and Murray carried him through the smoke and dark to the bow of the rig and the lifeboats. 110 Outside, the derrick fire roared upward into the night sky, an inferno throwing off searing heat and clouds of black smoke . The blinding yellow of the flames was the only illumination except for the occasional flashlight. The rigs alarms were going off, while over the public announcement system Keplinger yelled, THIS IS NOT A DRILL 111 As the 12National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling crew struggled out of the blasted quarters, galley, and offices, in various states of undress, they converged in a chaotic and panicked mass at the lifesaving vessels, putting on life vests. 112 Sandell, the gantry crane operator, had escaped and come around the port side of the deck to the life vessels. It was a lot of screaming, just a lot of screaming, a lot of hollering, a lot of scared people, including me, was scared. And trying to get people on boats. It was very unorganizedwe had some wounded we was putting in the boat.Had people on the boat yelling, Drop the boat, drop the boat, and we still didnt have everybody on the boat yet. We was still trying to get people on the boat and trying to calm them down enough totrying to calm them down enough to get everybody on the boat. And there was people jumping off the side. We was trying to get an accurate count and just couldnt get an accurate count because people were just jumping off the boat. 113 * * * * On the Bankston, Captain Alwin J. Landry was on the bridge update his log when his mate noticed the mud. Landry stepped out and saw mud falling on the back half of my boat, kind of like a black rain. He called the Deepwater Horizon bridge to say, Im getting mud on me. Landry instructed his crew to get inside. The Deepwater Horizon called back and told him to move back 500 meters. 114 A crew member noticed a mud-covered seagull and egret fall to the deck. 115 Shortly after, Landry saw the rig explode. Before the ship could move away, his crew had to abstract the long mud transfer hose connecting them to the rig. 116 As they scrambled to disconnect, the Bankston slowly moved 100 meters back, then 500 meters . As the rig went dark, and secondary explosions rocked the decks, the Bankston turned on its searchlight.Landry could see the Deepwater Horizon crew mustering by the portside life vessels. Thats when I seen the first of three or four people jump to the water from the rig. 117 One of those was Gregory Meche, a compliance specialist. After five minutes of the chaos around the lifeboats, and a series of large explosions, he headed down to the lower deck. He jumped into the water. 118 Antonio Gervasio, the Bankstons relief chief, and two others began launching the ships fast rescue craft. 119 Within a minute or two of the explosions, they got the boat take down into the water, and noticed how calm the Gulf was. 20 I saw the first person jump in the water. So I told one of the guys to keep an eye on him. 121 The rig life jackets were reflective, and as the fast craft made its first sweep round from one side of the burning rig to the other, they hauled Meche and two or three others out of the water. 122 * * * * Back on the rig, Transoceans Winslow had made his way from the coffee shop to the lifeboats, surviving the second blasts jolt of concussive force, which blew in the Chapter One 13 13 corridors walls and ceilings. On the deck, a firestorm of flames roared in the night sky above the derrick. 23 Winslow directed the dazed crew toward the covered life-saving vessels, instructing the first arrivals, We need to make sure we get a good head count. Seeing Captain Kuchta standing at the starboard bridge door, he ran up, and said people should evacuate. Kuc